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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the TurkStream project in light 
of the security of demand for Russian natural gas. The analysis focuses on the 
relations between the EU and Russia, with further focus on Eastern Europe, 
accompanied by a description of the power engineering actions affecting the 
old continent from 2014 to date. Based on the analysis, it can be established 
that although on the face of it, the Russian-inspired project has policy and 
business goals, but demand security considerations also lie in the background, 
fuelled by significant geopolitical endeavours. 
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Introduction 
In the 21st century, Russia’s power lies primarily in its outstanding 
hydrocarbon base rather than its economic or military capacity. Regarding the 
natural gas sector, Russia’s potential can be grasped from either the supply or 
the demand side. According to the statistics compiled by BP, the continent-
sized country has the highest volume of recoverable reserves in the world, 
amounting to 35,000 billion cubic meters or 18.1 per cent of the total natural 
gas reserves on the Earth. More than 635.6 billion cubic meters of this amount 
were being extracted at the end of 2017, representing more than 17.3 per cent 
of the global production. Of this amount, 215.4 billion cubic meters were 
intended to be transported through pipelines per annum, which ranks the 
country first in the world in respect of export volumes (BP, 2018). Europe is 
the traditional market for Russian natural gas. In 2017, nearly 88 per cent of 
the Russian piped natural gas intended for export was sold on the old continent, 
and this amount provided more than 35 per cent of Europe’s total gas 
consumption (531.7 billion cubic meters per annum, (BP, 2018). In a 
breakdown by country, it is clear that the dependence of the European Union’s 
eastern Member States on Moscow for natural gas is considered as especially 
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high: Latvia, Slovakia, Finland and Estonia purchase 100 per cent, the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria and Lithuania 80 per cent, Greece, Austria and Hungary 60 
per cent of the gas they need from Russia (Marshall, 2016). These peculiar data 
have led to a peculiar Russian natural gas strategy, including a one-off tactical 
element called the “TurkStream Gas Pipe Project”.  
This paper has a double purpose: on the one hand, the considerations that 
have called forth this large-scale project are described, on the one hand, and 
intends to evidence that the Russian concept differs to a large extent from the 
classical policy and project implementation plans, on the other. The reason is 
that although prima facie the Russian-inspired project is aimed at policy and 
business goals, demand security considerations fuelled by significant 
geopolitical endeavours also lie in the background. This analysis focuses on 
the relations between the EU and Russia, with particular attention to Eastern 
Europe, and is complete with a description of the power engineering actions 
affecting the old continent from 2014 to date. In respect of the TurkStream, the 
Russian demand security strategy of the past few years are studied, excluding 
the concepts related to the 2014 downslide in oil prices. 
 
Russian energy security and security of demand 
As an indispensable prerequisite to professional approach to this field, the 
concept of energy security needs to be determined, but unfortunately, there is 
no uniform international definition.1 When experts, primarily from the West, 
attempt to define energy security, they take the security of and provision for 
energy supply to a given economic and/or political region as their starting 
point. In this approach, the aim of energy strategy is to ensure uninterrupted 
energy supply using various political and economic implements. This strategy 
is primarily adopted by regions with very limited sources of energy and 
hydrocarbon reserves or not at all. The energy strategies applied by importers 
are thus determined by the pressure of long-term import. For this reason, net 
energy importers are disposed to consider the terms “energy security” and 
“supply security” as synonyms, despite the fact that the approach focusing on 
supply is only one version of energy strategy. The uneven geographical 
distribution of energy sources, primarily hydrocarbons, which took on priority 
during the Cold War, was accompanied by a diversity of energy strategies. 
Therefore, in countries which have access to abundant mineral oil and natural 
gas resources, and as such, are highly likely to be exporters, the above strategy 
has no explanatory force. In this case, energy security focuses on ensuring the 
security of demand and on using incomes earned on supply for the achievement 
of political and/or economic goals. Instead of allocating assets to the goal of 
                                                          
1 The concept of energy security may be approached in numerous ways, from traditional 
definitions based on survival (Buzan et al., 1998) to explanations emphasizing two (Cherp et 
al., 2012) or more dimensions (Wicks, 2009, 8). For more details, see Weiner (2017, 3-5). 
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securing energy supply, the income derived from energy supply (energy 
export) is (or may be) allocated to various political and/or economic goals. 
Such goals are generally unrelated to the energy industry, and in most cases, 
they are economic or geopolitical in character. This concept highlights the 
number one aim of Russian energy policy in the piped natural gas business. As 
a net energy exporter, Russia’s primary aim is to maintain/increase the security 
of supply in the natural gas sector. 
 
Initial situation 
In order to understand the emergence of the idea of the TurkStream Project, 
it is indispensable to have a look at its macroeconomic environment.2This 
paper focuses on one of the potential terminals of the envisaged pipe network, 
the eastern part of the EU. The concept of the TurkStream was inspired and is 
affected by numerous events, like Russia’s relations with Ukraine, the 
European Union and the United States. Before a presentation of an alternative 
pipeline plan, the potential competitors also need to be mentioned, whether 
they are alternative pipeline plans or countries with potential gas resources. 
 
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict 
Although for a long time Russia might have secretly hoped to be able to 
stabilize the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine, however, these hopes 
failed with the events of late 2013, which led to a conflict between Kiev and 
Moscow, to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and to armed conflicts in 
Eastern Ukraine. As Ukraine and Russia are de facto at war, in order to retain 
its significant economic and political blackmailing potential, the former 
definitely does not want to give up Ukrainian gas transit.3Moreover, as Kiev 
wanted to eliminate its dependence on Russian natural gas, they took action to 
increase their energy independence. Prior to the escalation of the Russian–
Ukrainian conflict, in 2010 approximately 60 billion cubic metres of natural 
gas was consumed in Ukraine per annum, 66 per cent was imported from 
Russia and 33 per cent came from domestic extraction. In 2017, consumption 
fell to nearly half, i.e. 32 billion cubic metres. They have maintained domestic 
extraction at approximately 20 billion cubic metres, and the remaining part is 
imported from the European Union through Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. 
The Russian-Ukrainian relations are further strained by the court cases related 
to natural gas transit. Back in January 2016, the Ukrainian Anti-Monopoly 
                                                          
2 As in economics stakeholder-oriented leadership (Blaskovics 2016) is a crucial issue, the 
interests of regional and global stakeholders are also of key importance in energy strategies 
(Deutsch, 2013). 
3In the mid-2000s, the overwhelming majority of the Russian natural gas export was delivered 
to Western Europe through Ukraine. This made Kiev one of the pivotal gas transit stations in 
the world. 
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Commission imposed a fine of 85.9 billion hryvna on Gazprom for the 
unilateral abuse of natural gas transit, and this decision has been approved by 
several Ukrainian courts since then. This conflict is also taking place in the 
international arena: in February 2018, the Stockholm Arbitration ordered 
Gazprom to pay USD 2.56 billion for underperforming its transit contract 
concluded with the Ukrainian Naftogaz.4 
 
Western decisions and sanctions against Russia 
As a result of a change in the legal status of Crimea, relations between the 
Western world and Russia are not ideal. The parties have adopted mutual 
sanctions against one another, and extend them every six months. Relations 
only deteriorated with the poisoning of the late Sergey Scripal, a Russian spy 
living in England. Due to the sanctions, neither the current state nor the 
prospects are bright for the Russian economy.5Moscow is only given limited 
access to Western capital and technology (Tarar et al., 2018). The effects of 
the sanctions were somewhat mitigated by the central fund established during 
the time of higher oil prices. However, the reserves saved in this fund were 
used for offsetting the budget losses suffered on account of the low energy 
prices instead of restructuring the economy. 
The third energy package of the EU, which entered into force in March 
2011, hit the Russian security of demand seriously. The provisions of the 
document effectively prevented the Russian-inspired Southern Steam from 
reaching the territory of the EU.6 In addition, three years ago, the European 
Commission launched an antitrust investigation against Gazprom based on 
complaints by five Central and Eastern European countries claiming that the 
Russians were abusing their competitive advantage and were exporting natural 
gas at a price significantly above the market rate. Based on the investigation it 
was established that the Russian company had infringed upon the European 
Union’s antitrust rules by adopting a comprehensive strategy for the 
distribution of the natural gas market between eight Member States of the EU, 
namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia, and this enabled the company to charge higher gas 
                                                          
4 In June 2018, the appellate court of Svea County in Sweden suspended the enforcement of 
the decision adopted by the Stockholm Arbitration. Then Naftogaz sought actin in Switzerland, 
Great Britain and the Netherlands in order to seize and obtain certain European assets and 
shares of Gazprom. 
5The situation of the Russians was further aggravated by the fact that oil prices dropped and 
got stuck at a low level. 
6 The conceptual scheme of the Southern Stream was devised to maintain the gas supply status 
quo in Central and Eastern Europe. The project promised an alternative natural gas corridor 
interlinking Europe with Russia, as a means to put political pressure on Ukraine. The pipe plan 
was a promise for the countries rich in natural gas in the Caspian Region for the maintenance 
of export to the West through Russia. For further details see Virág, 2014. 
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prices in five countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The 
European Commission set requirements for the natural gas supplier Gazprom, 
and these significantly changed the service provider’s operation in the Central 
and Eastern European gas markets. 
In addition to the EU, the USA also imposed sanctions on Russia. The 
American legislation launched the first wave after the occupation of Crimea, 
and the second one in response to Russia’s presumed interference with the US 
election campaign. In 2017, the American Congress approved the sanction 
package, among others already with the key objective of paralyzing the 
Russian natural gas industrial project, including the construction of new 
pipelines (CAATSA, 2017). Although Washington refuted that these sanctions 
served as means of enforcing US corporate and economic interests, the statutes 
clearly specified the natural gas pipe project called Nord Stream 2 (see below). 
 
Alternative network projects in Eastern Europe 
As in the eastern part of the EU the natural gas supply network was made 
for the westward export of Soviet gas, in Eastern Europe a pipe network was 
made in an east-west direction. For this reason, networks in the north-south 
direction were missing in the region for a long time. The Russian-Ukrainian 
conflicts (especially the 2006 and the 2009 gas crises) clearly showed that in 
the eastern part of EU, the natural gas supply network required significant 
improvements. For this very reason, numerous countries in the region saw 
significant opportunities in the creation and improvement of so-called cross-
border capacities interlinking Member States for the purposes of natural gas 
supply.  In addition, there is great potential in exploring alternative transport 
and extraction technologies, including the unfolding of LNG import and 
unconventional gas extraction. In the eastern part of the EU, it is worth 
emphasizing the concept of the north-south energy corridor (New Europe 
Transmission System, NETS). The novelty of the policy is that it provides an 
opportunity for direct natural gas trade in a north-south direction within the 
European Union, exclusively with east-west links. 
In the framework of the concept, numerous new interconnectors were 
implemented in the past decade and may be established in the future. The 
European Commission also provides significant support for these projects. 
Thus, most recently, in February 2017, EUR 444 million has been approved 
for 18 European electricity and natural gas infrastructure projects to the debit 
of the CEF fund promoting the interconnection of Member States. In the 
framework of the north-south energy corridor, funds are provided in the 
amount of EUR 4 billion for natural gas pipes (European Commission, 2017).  
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The highest amount, EUR 108 million, is granted for the construction of the 
Polish-Slovakian interconnector pipeline.7 
At Krk Island in Croatia, a facility suitable for receiving liquefied natural 
gas would be established. According to the plans, the terminal would be 
initially suitable for receiving 2.6 billion cubic metres of natural gas. If 
implemented, these capacities may be expanded in the future. The geopolitical 
significance of the capital investment project exceeds its economic importance, 
as it may provide an alternative to the import of Russian natural gas for the 
countries of the region, and can at the same time lower the purchase price of 
the latter. This capital investment project is also supported by the EU (List, 
2017). 
As a northern counterpart of the Croatian LNG terminal, in October 2015, 
the liquid natural gas terminal of a similarly strategic significance was handed 
over in Swinoujscie, in the north of Poland, to diversify gas supply. The 
company Polskie LNG is in the ownership of the Polish state-owned Gaz-
System. The terminal that has two gas containers has a capacity of 5 billion 
cubic metres. The pipelines built from the Baltic Seas gas port may transmit 
natural gas towards Gdansk and Lwówek. Thus, with the help of the existing 
gas interconnections, natural gas may well be supplied to other countries in the 
region. The terminal may contribute to releasing Poland from its need to import 
natural gas from Russia by 2022, after the expiry of the long-term contract 
concluded with Gazprom. 
 
Alternative resource countries in Eastern Europe 
The potential inherent in unconventional natural gas resources and the 
related technology resulted in a major breakthrough in the United States. The 
development also coined as the “American shale gas revolution” enabled 
extraction from natural gas fields that had previously been known but were 
difficult and very costly to access. Thus by the 2010s, the USA had become 
the largest gas extractor in the world.  
The LNG technology opened up a way for the American natural gas to 
Europe. Since early 2016, the old continent’s import of American LNG has 
increased from zero to 2.8 billion cubic metres per annum, which also means 
that the share of LNG export from the US to Europe grew from 3 to 10 per cent 
between 2016 and 2017. Although the current volume is insignificant, the 
American efforts reveal that the objective of the US policy is to create a market 
for the American liquefied natural gas in Europe, and to discourage Russia’s 
dominance in the regional gas market.8 Complete with the EU’s support to the 
                                                          
7The European Investment Bank provides a EUR 70 million loan for the implementation of 
the gas pipeline, which may have been completed by 2021 according to the plans. 
8 In addition to the LNG export terminal located in Louisiana, USA, five other harbours may 
be built in the next 2 to 3 years. 
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LNG technology, 9this already poses a serious risk to the security of demand 
for Russian natural gas. 
The above described terminal already operative in Poland, and the one 
waiting for implementation in Croatia are key factors in the European energy 
game: through these terminals, in the future, Eastern-European countries may 
purchase American natural gas in bulk.10 Although in the price competition, 
the LNG received from the USA is in a less favourable position than the 
Russian natural gas, this may be partly offset by the above-specified American 
sanctions. 
In addition to the USA, Romania also appeared as an exporter on the map 
of Eastern Europe. In February 2012, the Romanian Petrom, a member of the 
American ExxonMobil and the Austrian OMV Group, announced that they had 
found significant natural gas reserves at a deposit called Neptun, located in a 
depth of 930 metres under the ground and 170 km from the Romanian shores 
of the Black Sea. According to the first estimates, the reserves explored at Well 
Domino 1 may be in the range of 42-48 billion cubic metres. ExxonMobil and 
OMV Petrom is expected to start the extraction of natural gas from the Black 
Sea in 2020 or 2021, and 6 billion cubic metres of natural gas is planned to be 
brought to the surface annually. Thus, the opportunity may open up for the 
construction of a Romanian-Hungarian-Austrian natural gas corridor. If the 
project called BRUA is implemented, initially 1.75 billion and after 2022, at 
least 4.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas may be transmitted through the 
network from the area of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea per annum. To 
this end, the supply capacities of the high-pressure gas network need to be 
expanded from Romania towards Austria, and new pipelines will also be 
needed. The EU and the European Bank For Reconstruction and Development 
also support their implementation.11 
Finally, it is important to mention another potential source country, 
Azerbaijan. The natural gas extracted from the Azeri Shah Deniz II field may 
reach Europe through the Trans Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) and the 
                                                          
9 The EU co-financed infrastructure improvement projects related to LNG, or assumed 
liabilities for financing them, in the amount of EUR 638 million. Thus by 2021, the current 
capacity of 150 billion cubic metres may increase by an additional 15 billion cubic metres. 
During the July 2018 meeting of Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Trump, increase in Europe’s 
import of American LNG was promised. 
10In January 2018, at a press conference held jointly with his Polish counterpart, former US 
Foreign Secretary Rex Tillerson mentioned in Warsaw that the Russian natural gas could be 
replaced by US liquefied natural gas free of risks. In July 2017, Donald Trump also had talks 
in the Polish capital with Central and Eastern European leaders about American LNG export.  
11 The EUR 149 million contributed by Transgaz, the company in charge of the management 
of the Romanian natural gas pipe network, was completed by loans granted in October 2017 
by the EBRD in the amount of EUR 60 million and EUR 50 million by the European 
Investment Bank. The total cost of constructing the 1318 km long BRUA pipeline is estimated 
at EUR 550 million, of which the EU provides EUR 179 million. 
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Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).12A memorandum of understanding to 
implement the former was signed by the Azeri SOCAR and the Turkish 
BOTAS and TPAO companies in December 2011, followed by an 
intergovernmental agreement about the establishment of the gas pipe, signed 
by Ankara and Baku in 2012. The first pipe was laid in March 2015 in the 
eastern Kars Province of Turkey. The pipeline would link Azerbaijan’s natural 
gas fields around the Caspian Sea with Europe. The network will run along a 
total of 1850 km from the Georgia border to Greece through Turkey, with a 
19-km section under the Sea of Marmara.13 The total value of the project is 
approximately USD 8.5 billion. 
Through the Trans Anatolian Pipeline, Turkey will receive 2 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas in the first year, to be increased by 2 billion cubic metres 
every year to follow, in sum, achieving 6 billion cubic metres per annum by 
2021. The remaining 10 billion cubic metres can be sold in Europe. According 
to the plans, in mid-2019 the pipeline with a total capacity of annual 16 billion 
cubic metres may be able to transmit natural gas to the Greek border. In the 
future, network capacity may be increased in two steps: first up to 22 billion 
per annum, and then up to 31 billion per annum. The pipe network will have 
two off-take stations in Turkey: one in Eskesehir and another in Eastern 
Thrace. TANAP will connect to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) running 
towards the west at the Turkish border town Ipsala. 
The memorandum of understanding on the TAP pipeline was signed by the 
representatives of Albania, Italy and Greece at the end of September 2012. The 
project will cost approximately USD 45 billion, and will be in the ownership 
of Socar (20 per cent), BP (20 per cent), Snam (20 per cent), Fluxys (19 per 
cent), Enagas (16 per cent) and Axpo (5 per cent). The Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP) would start from Thessaloniki in Greece and reach Southern Italy by 
the shortest route, passing through Albania and touching the Adriatic Sea. The 
pipeline is expected to have a capacity of 10 billion cubic metres per annum, 
with the option to double at a later stage. 
 
General objectives of Russia and its strategic steps 
Having faced the challenges outlined above, Russia wished to stabilize its 
power positions in the European natural gas sector. The underlying reasons 
were included both political and economic considerations. Moscow made 
efforts at achieving the following objectives in the natural gas sector: 
• The pacification or unhooking of the gatekeeper countries: ensuring 
undisturbed and uninterrupted natural gas trade between Russia and the 
European Union through reconciliation with the transit states, called 
                                                          
12 TANAP is linked to the Shah Deniz II field by the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). 
13Eighty per cent of the pipes used for the construction of the section in Turkey were 
manufactured by Turkish, and the remaining 20 per cent by Chinese companies. 
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“gatekeepers”, which divide the region, and if this proves impossible, 
bypassing them using alternative pipe networks. 
• To regain the confidence of European consumers, 
• To block potential countries of resource: to prevent natural gas extracting 
and/or exporter countries from direct access, i.e. access without Russian 
control, to the European markets. 
The Russian objectives are based on a strategy of following three pillars: 
• Seizing/increasing/retaining control over the transit infrastructure through 
political influence or pressure, and/or the creation of an alternative 
transmission infrastructure in order to eliminate the “gatekeepers”; 
• Guaranteeing safe natural gas supply for European consumers through 
initiatives made at alternative natural gas projects serving Russian interests; 
• To obtain/retain monopoly as a natural gas buyer of alternative sources, and 
laying the foundations of bids that are more favourable than the alternative 
sources. 
Finally, the compilation of a strategy was started through a complex series 
of tactical steps, namely by the diversification of the existing Russian 
transmission routes, or at least its communication in order to exert pressure. 
One of the manifestations of this series of tactical steps was the TurkStream 
natural gas pipeline project. 
 
The TurkStream in the service of the Russian natural gas strategy 
The TurkStream project was placed on the agenda as a Russian concept, 
directly after the Southern Stream had been closed in 2014.14 Similarly to the 
previous pipeline plans, the conceptual scheme of this project serves the 
retention of Russia’s status quo in natural gas supply to Eastern and Central as 
well as Southern and Eastern Europe. Thus it also applies to the TurkStream 
that instead of implementation, in the case of gas transmission to the West, the 
first and foremost project indicator is whether the existing power positions can 
be maintained and increased or not. 
The Russian-inspired alternative natural gas corridor to the south-eastern 
part of Europe was kept on the agenda primarily because of the further 
exacerbation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the risks to the 
security of supply to Eastern and Central and South-eastern European 
countries, which resulted - among others - from the former, and the spread of 
the alternative natural gas supply and extraction projects outlined above. 
An intergovernmental agreement was concluded about the project by 
Russia and Turkey in October 2016. The envisaged natural gas pipeline would 
                                                          
14The primary reason for this can be traced back to the energy policy debates between Moscow 
and Brussels. The about the previously outlined third energy package contributed to a large 
extent to the closure of the Southern Stream project. For more details, see Nógrádi & Virág 
(2015, 39-43). 
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have a land section and a 910-km long part running under the Black Sea, the 
latter financed by Gazprom. Pipe laying started in May 2017 and had been 
completed by the end of April 2018, when the first offshore section was laid in 
the proximity of Turkey’s Black See coast. 
One of the two land pipelines will only be allowed to supply natural gas 
to Turkey. This has a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic metres per annum, and 
will be in the 100 per cent ownership of the Turkish national mineral oil and 
natural gas company Botas. The other land pipeline will be allowed to transmit 
Russian natural gas to Europe through Turkey. Gazprom and Botas would have 
equal shares in the ownership of this 180-km long section, which would also 
have a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic metres per annum. 
 
The TurkStream and the gatekeepers 
Right from the moment of suggesting the TurkStream Pipeline in 2014, 
Gazprom has given clear indications that among many other factors, this 
project should be understood in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian 
relationship. 
Already in a December 2014 interview, given to the Russian public service 
television, Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller said that while Germany had a key 
intermediary role along the northern transport route (Nord Streams 1 and 2),15 
Turkey would attend to the same duty along the southern line.  During his talks 
with Maros Sefcovic, Vice-President of the European Commission and 
European Commissioner for the Energy, in January 2015, Miller confirmed his 
previous thought that Russia would redirect the natural gas supplied to its 
European partners through Ukraine to Turkey (Gazprom, 2015a). All this was 
a clear indication for Kiev that Gazprom would not give up the idea of 
establishing a gas pipeline bypassing Ukraine from the south after expiry of 
the transit agreement concluded by the Russians and the Ukrainians, and with 
this action gas supplies to Europe through the country may well be eliminated 
altogether. 
Simultaneously with the completion of the TurkStream pipeline, in March 
2018 Gazprom announced that they had started the cancellation of both long-
term natural gas agreements concluded with Ukraine.16 If natural gas transit 
                                                          
15The Nord Stream, running along more than 1220 km and having a capacity of 55 billion 
cubic metres per annum, connects Russia directly with Germany under the Baltic Sea. The first 
part of the natural gas pipeline was handed over in November 2011, and the second in October 
2012.Due to the already operative Nord Stream, Ukraine’s role in Russian natural gas export 
has dramatically fallen from 70 to 40 per cent in the past few years. 
16The Russian Gazprom and Naftogaz entered into two long-term natural gas agreements in 
2009. One of them concerns the export of Russian natural gas to Ukraine, and the other is 
about transiting Russian natural gas through Ukraine to Europe. Both agreements were 
concluded for a definite period up to 31 December 2019. The document was approved when 
Yulia Tymoshenko was in office, who was then incarcerated on account of the agreement. 
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through Ukraine is completely eliminated, Kiev would lose several billions of 
US dollars a year, due to missing transit charges.17 At the same time, with the 
participation of Russian and Ukrainian officials, negotiations started in Berlin 
in the spring of 2018 to settle the disputes that had evolved as a result of the 
fall in Russian natural gas transit in Ukraine. In early April Alexey Miller 
confirmed and, nuancing his previous statements, he declared that transit 
through Ukraine may fall to 10-15 cubic metres per annum when the supply of 
natural gas to Europe starts through the Nord Stream 2 and the TurkStream 
pipeline starts. All this was confirmed at the meeting of Vladimir Putin and 
Angela Merkel in Merseburg at the end of August 2018. It was declared that 
the alternative pipelines would “only” drastically reduce but not eliminate the 
role of the Ukrainian transit pipeline. 
It is a fact that in relation to the TurkStream section running towards 
Europe, the potential new “gatekeeper” Turkey, used for route diversification, 
represented a serious uncertainty factor. The planned route of the natural gas 
pipeline to Turkey was set uring Alexey Miller’s visit to Ankara in January 
2015 The TurkStream would reach Europe along the route of the previously 
planned Southern Stream. According to this plan, 910 km the pipeline would 
run offshore, under the Black Sea, with the landing point at Kiyiköy and 
connecting to the Turkish natural gas supply network at the town Lüleburgaz, 
74 km from the shore. Then it would run to the town Ipsala near the Greek 
border. According to the initial plans, four pipelines were planned to be built 
under the Black Sea, each enabling the transmission of 15.75 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas per annum. Thus in the aggregate, 63 billion cubic metres 
of natural gas would have been transmitted to Turkey, an amount identical with 
the previous plans for the Southern Stream. Of this, 47 billion cubic metres 
would be supplied to Europe, and 16 billion cubic metres directly to Turkey.  
At that time the first delivery was scheduled for December 2016 (Gazprom, 
2015b). 
Relations between Moscow and Ankara were rather turbulent and 
fluctuating between 2014 and 2018, right from the announcement of the 
parameters of the very first alternative pipeline plan and capacity. In the first 
phase, Turkey only wanted to implement the first section of the pipeline, which 
would have provided access to natural gas for their own consumption. In 
addition, the Turkish authorities withheld the authorizations required for the 
pipeline construction, and Ankara liked to speak of the TANAP pipeline, a 
competitor to the Russian one. Right at the beginning of the procedure, all this 
shed light to the fact that the management of the TurkStream was more 
important for the Russian than for the Turkish party, or at least the latter has a 
stronger bargaining power than previously expected in Moscow. For a short 
                                                          
17 In 2017 Ukraine transited 93.5 billion cubic metres of Russian natural gas. Kiev earned USD 
3.5 billion on this business, representing 3 per cent of the country’s annual GDP. 
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while it seemed that the pipeline project may well be withdrawn from the 
agenda.18 Finally, after the normalization of Russian and Turkish relations, 
preparation of the TurkStream was started. 
It is a fact that the planned volume of natural gas that can be transmitted 
through the Turkish Stream has fallen from the previously expected 63 billion 
cubic metres to 32 cubic metres per annum. Meanwhile, in the relationship 
between Ukraine and Russia, this has not reduced Moscow’s blackmailing 
potential against Kiev. This is because despite halving the planned capacity of 
the TurkStream, the capacity of the NordStream, also avoiding Ukraine, may 
double if the Nord Stream 2 concept is implemented, as discussed below. 
 
The TurkStream and regaining the confidence of European consumers 
Strategically, Moscow handles the western and eastern Member States of 
the EU separately. The Member States that accessed the European Union in 
2004 are transit countries and well-paying markets at the same time. For this 
reason, the Russian leadership endeavoured to either avoid the region by an 
alternative natural gas pipeline (see the Nord Streams 1 and 2), or to make them 
interested in Russian-inspired projects even by dividing them if they 
participated in projects adversely affecting the Russian objectives. This was 
actually the essence of the Southern Stream, and later on the concept of the 
TurkStream. 
As explained above, Gazprom would not give up the idea of establishing 
a natural gas pipeline bypassing Ukraine from the south upon, and 
simultaneously gives indications from time to time that on expiry of the transit 
agreement between the Russians and the Ukrainians, the complete termination 
of natural gas supplies to Europe through the country is not excluded. All this 
represents a major challenge for the countries of Southeast, Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
According to the plans, the pipeline called TurkStream is not allowed to 
reach Europe, and can only run up to the border between Greece and Turkey, 
the partner countries purchasing natural gas from Russia would need an 
appropriate gas pipeline network within a short time frame to reach the gas 
distributor planned in Western Turkey. Without the Ukrainian transit, Slovakia 
                                                          
18Many consider the shooting of the Russian fighter-bomber serving in Syria as the main 
reason for taking the TurkStream off the agenda for the time being, as Russia suspended the 
preparatory works for the construction of the natural gas pipeline TurkStream.  The truth may 
rather be that with reference to the political tension, Russia waved the project about which 
talks had been suspended well before the incident, approximately at the time when the idea of 
the Russian-inspired Nord Stream 2 pipeline project emerged, as discussed below. 
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may lose its previous key role and transit revenues.19 Undoubtedly, Bulgaria 
may lose the most, as 90 per cent of its natural gas is imported from Russia.20 
The gap caused by the failure of the Southern Stream required numerous 
alternative concepts in the Eastern and Central European and in the South-
eastern European regions regarding connection to the TurkStream. Thus a 
competition that may not be considered as exceptional started in energy for the 
connection of Europe to the natural gas supply transmitted through the 
TurkStream, 21 and this reduced the chances of implementing other alternative 
concepts. Gazprom also came up with an alternative route running through 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary to contest other competing network 
developments in the region. This is enabled by the project companies in charge 
of the implementation of the European section of the previous Southern Stream 
in the above-specified countries, and negotiations have started with Serbia 
about the Serbian Stream and with Bulgaria about the Bulgarian Stream.  
The TurkStream may mitigate the risks to the security of supply in 
numerous Central and Eastern European Countries, also in respect of another 
Russian-inspired project, the Nord Stream 2. While consultations on the 
implementation of a southern natural gas corridor (whether the Nabucco, the 
Blue or the Southern Stream or any other project) have been ongoing for more 
than a decade with the involvement of a dozen countries in the eastern and 
south-eastern periphery of the European Union, despite the relations between 
the West and Russia, simply coined as the “new cold war”, Gazprom intends 
to construct two new pipelines of an aggregate capacity of 55 billion cubic 
metres parallel to the already existing Nord Stream, under the name “Nord 
Stream 2”, in the framework of the German-Russian bargain. 
The Russian company expects to hire considerable European companies 
for the implementation of the project. Gazprom’s partners include the Dutch-
British Shell, the German Uniper and Wintershall, the British-Danish Royal 
Dutch Shell, the Austrian OMV and the French Engie. Each of the five 
European companies invest EUR 950 million in the 9.5 billion project. The 
                                                          
19 A significant part of the natural gas is transmitted from Russia by transit through 
Ukraine and Slovakia to Western Europe. The network manager Eustream makes a profit of 
several hundred million euros in Slovakia annually. The company is in the 51 per cent 
ownership of the Slovakian state, and the central budget earns about EUR 160 million annually 
(Lajos P., 2015). 
20Due to its geographical situation, Bulgaria had a significant role in the alternative natural gas 
project. A glimpse is given into the bargain between Russia and Bulgaria in relation to the 
Southern Stream pipeline in a paper by Jim Yardley and Jo Becker, published in the New York 
Times in late 2014 (Yardley & Becker, 2014). 
21 Outstanding alternative plans include the Tesla and the Eastring projects. For more details, 
see (Virág, 2016, p. 97-99). 
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single shareholder of the Nord Stream 2 remains the Russian Gazprom.22 From 
a Russian perspective, the advantage of the network running along more than 
1220 km with an annual capacity of 55 billion cubic metres against its southern 
counterparts is that it connects Russia directly with Germany on a route under 
the Baltic Sea. Thus there would be no gatekeeper between the Russian Viborg 
and the German Greifswald to prevent the operation of the network 
transmitting additional 55 billion cubic metres per annum. Moreover, the route 
is 2000 km less than the one currently supplying Russian natural gas to some 
of the EU Member States through Ukraine. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, the start date of deliveries was expected in late 
2019, just at the time when Russia held out the prospects of stopping supply to 
Europe through Ukraine. In the aggregate, the Nord Stream 2 project thus 
increases the risk that after the expiry of the Ukrainian transit agreement, the 
pivotal European transit route in Ukraine, currently having an approximate 
annual capacity of 150 billion cubic metres, ceases to exist. The risks have a 
serious impact on the Eastern and Central European countries directly 
connected to the Ukrainian transit network and may consequently lose their 
current transit positions.23 In addition to the losses of transit revenues, their 
current bargaining power vis-a-vis the Russian supplier regarding the trade 
agreements for the supply of natural gas may decrease. Thus, there is a reason 
seven EU Member States, including Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
the three Baltic states called the attention of the European Commission in 
December 2015, after shareholders’ agreement about the Nord Stream 2, to the 
adverse impacts of the Russian-German project aimed at the expansion of the 
Nord Stream on the security of energy supply.According to the authors of the 
letter, “the maintenance of the transport route through Ukraine is in the 
strategic interest of the EU” (Bruxinfo, 2016). In their opinion, if the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline is built and natural gas transit through Ukraine is terminated 
after 2019, with the sole exception of the Jamal pipeline, all the Russian natural 
gas export routes to the EU would enter the Union in Germany. This would 
undermine the security of supply to Europe in comparison to the current status 
quo. 
However, it is a fact that originally there were ten Member States against 
Nord Stream 2. With the exception of Slovenia and Croatia, all the Eastern 
European Member States of the EU seemed to give voice to concerns about 
                                                          
22 According the previous plans, European investors would have purchased 50 per cent of 
Gazprom’s shares; each company would have obtained 10 per cent interest. This plan was sent 
to the German and Polish competition authorities for judgment. However, the competent Polish 
authority rejected the plan of the joint venture established by the acquisition of the ownership 
share, and so the affected companies abandoned the original concept. 
23In terms of diversification, in addition to the Ukrainian network, the significance of the 
Slovakian, Hungarian and Romanian transit networks may also decrease significantly in an 
east-west direction. 
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this topic. Finally, the Czech Republic, as a would-be eastern distributor of the 
natural gas supplied through the Nord Stream 2, and Bulgaria and Greece, 
affected in the TurkStream, refused to sign the letter written in protest. 
With consideration to all these, interestingly, the Eastern European 
grievances caused by the Nord Stream 2 pipeline may be relieved by keeping  
the TurkStream, another Russian-inspired project, on the agenda, despite the 
fact that at the time the study was made, only the first branch, supplying 
Turkish consumers, was expected to be built. The construction of the second 
branch is only envisaged after Gazprom has been given firm guarantees from 
the European Commission.24 
 
The TurkStream and the blocking of alternative sources 
Similarly to the previous Southern Stream project, the TurkStream can be 
considered as a kind of a blocking project, which renders it difficult to 
implement other projects suitable for the transmission of  natural gas from 
alternative sources to Eastern and Central as well as South-eastern Europe. 
Such pipelines under construction include the above described Trans-
Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), which may enable the transmission of Azeri 
natural gas through Turkey to Europe. 
Although currently Gazprom has no reasonable chance to actually block 
the project, through TAP it may secure an exclusive opportunity for itself for 
Southern European flows, in other words, it may block connection to the 
previous Nabucco route by keeping the TurkStream on the agenda. Thus 
Gazprom’s current positions may be weakened in the Southern European 
region by 10 billion cubic metres of natural gas molecules transmitted from 
Azerbaijan, but the company may retain and perhaps improve its positions in 
South-eastern and Eastern and Central Europe. 
Another key issue for Russia is to promise and provide piped natural gas 
extracted on its own with conditions that are more favourable than the existing 
ones applied in Eastern Europe and those applied to the planned LNG 
terminals. In this respect, the LNG terminal already operative in Poland, and 
the one waiting for implementation in Croatia are of outstanding significance, 
as through these terminals, Eastern-European countries may purchase natural 
gas in bulk from the competitor United States in the future. 
It is no accident that in September 2017, the Russian natural gas industrial 
company Gazprom signed a long-term gas supply contract with the largest 
Croatian natural gas importer. The contracted amount will be sufficient to 
                                                          
24 “Now for the Western Balkans might be interested in another new project — Turkish Stream. 
And how we are ready to collaborate on this project, we have repeatedly said, if you’re 
interested EU countries to gas via this pipeline went to the territory of the EU, you need an 
absolute guarantee from the European Commission, in General, from the European Union” - 
Seregei Lavrov said at a press conference in Moscow (Russia News, 2018). 
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cover nearly the total volume imported by Croatia, thus rendering the LNG 
terminal near the Island of Krk unnecessary. The TurkStream is one of the 
alternatives for the secure transmission of the contracted volume. For Russia it 
is an advantage in the region that the currently the transmission of natural gas 
through pipes is considerably cheaper then the LNG version. 
In addition to the Russian alternative projects, among other factors, the 
high investment costs also contribute to the delay in implementation of the 
Croatian terminal. Originally, construction should have started in mid-2016 in 
order to have it completed by 2019 (when the long-term Russian-Ukrainian 
natural gas agreement expires). Even if implementation starts in 2018, a two-
year delay should still be expected. 
 
Conclusion 
Russia’s peculiar energy security considerations are due primarily to the 
unique geographical conditions and to its European relations in piped natural 
gas transmission. For this reason the Russian strategy focuses on the security 
of demand in relation to Europe. 
In the perspective of Russian energy security, the concept of the 
TurkStream was inspired and affected by a large number of events. The 
escalation of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev poses serious risks to the 
future transit of Russian natural gas to the West. Deteriorating relations with 
the USA and the EU have led to numerous decisions and sanctions harmful for 
Russia. To make matters worse, a boom in the unconventional American 
natural gas extraction and LNG export, and the loss of confidence in the 
European markets may change the European natural gas status quo over time. 
In the reviewed period, competition has already evolved between the 
transmission of LNG and the traditional, primarily Russian, piped natural gas, 
and between natural gas from Russian and other (e.g. Romanian and Azeri) 
sources. It is clear, that in this situation, the EU’s role as a buyer is 
appreciated25.  
In view of these challenges, the TurkStream is a kind of response to 
numerous alternative natural gas projects, whether planned or under 
implementation, in or aimed at Europe. The TurkStream can also be considered 
as a Russian-inspired plan that promotes a triple objective and facilitates the 
security of demand (see Table 1), in the case of natural gas supply to the West, 
primarily measured by the maintenance of or increase in the existing Russian 
power positions rather than implementation alone. 
 
 
                                                          
25This development is global and does not only relate to the USA-Russian relations. Between 
2017 and 2023, global trade in LNG is expected to increase by more than 100 billion cubic 
metres, from 391 billion to 505 billion cubic metres. 
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 Russian challenges  Russian strategy  
The TurkStream in the 
service of the Russian 
natural gas strategy 
1 
The Russian-
Ukrainian conflict 
→ 
Pacification / by-
passing the 
Ukrainian transit 
→ 
The TS as an alternative 
for by-passing the 
Ukrainian transit from the 
south 
2 
Anti-Russia 
sanctions/decisions 
→ 
Regaining the 
confidence of 
European 
consumers 
→ 
The TS as a promise to the 
eastern part of the EU for 
the maintenance of the 
status quo 
3 
Alternative Eastern 
European natural gas 
projects 
→ 
Blocking potential 
source countries 
→ 
The TS as an alternative 
that prevents any 
emerging new natural gas 
projects 
Table 1 The TurkStream Pipeline and the security of demand for Russian natural gas 
 
One of the focal points in the Russian strategy is to blackmail Kiev with 
the concept of the TurkStream viewed as an alternative natural gas corridor 
avoiding Ukraine. Keeping the project on the agenda may improve Russia’s 
bargaining power in the event of a future Russian-Ukrainian natural gas 
agreement, while the eventual connection of the planned network to Europe 
would appreciate Turkey as a new and alternative gatekeeper, involving 
additional future risks for Russia in addition to / instead of the old partner, 
Ukraine. 
As in addition to the USA, the EU also applies sanctions against Russia 
on account of the situation that has evolved in Ukraine, in addition to the 
pacification or avoidance of Ukraine, acting as a gatekeeper, the expansion of 
Western allies in the natural gas sector is important for Moscow, and this end 
may be served by the Nord Stream 2 project primarily in relation to Germany. 
Meanwhile, the mentioned project would further improve the infrastructure of 
Western European countries, which already have a highly developed natural 
gas pipeline network, as against the more poorly supplied Eastern European 
countries, which may be compensated for the closing up of or reduction in the 
Ukrainian transit route by the promise of the TurkStream. Naturally, all this 
presumes that the network will once reach the old continent beyond Turkey. 
The TurkStream can also be considered as a kind of a blocking project, 
which renders it difficult to implement other projects suitable for the 
transmission of  natural gas from alternative sources to Eastern and Central as 
well as South-eastern Europe. These include Eastern Europe’s connection to 
the Southern European network, intended to transmit Azeri natural gas to 
Europe (TANAP-TAP) or to the BRUA Pipeline planned to transmit 
Romanian gas from the Black Sea. 
For the time being it seems that despite the promise made by the 
TurkStream, the “additional capacities” facilitating the avoidance of Ukraine 
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are more likely to be built along the German-Russian route, i.e. in the north, 
than along the Turkish-Russian route in the south, however, there are several 
indications that the Nord Stream 2 alone will be insufficient to replace the 
Ukrainian natural gas transit after the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas agreement 
expires at the end of 2019. 
The causes include the expected increase in European natural gas demand, 
and the fact that the European pipe network intended to distribute the total 
natural gas capacity received through the Nord Stream 1 and 2 will not have 
been completed by 2019 expiry of the long-term Russian-Ukrainian natural gas 
agreement.26 In sum, the transit of natural gas through Ukraine with unknown 
conditions and the concept of the TurkStream jeopardizing the former may 
both remain on the table. 
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